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There is a widespread consensus that occupational segmentation is the chief determinant for gender dif-
ferences in wages in the Brazilian labor market. Although women correspond to 39% of the legal workers
in Brazil, they amount to only 23% of the employees in the sectors paying relative higher wages in 2004.
As well, segmentation increases if one restricts attention to managerial positions in that women hold only
14% of the latter. This suggests that there may exist a glass-ceiling eﬀect (Arulampalam, Booth and
Bryan, 2006) in the Brazilian job market to the extent that women may experience implicit barriers to
ascension in their jobs.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining data from the largest ﬁrms of the Brazilian
transformation industry. In particular, our goal is to verify whether there indeed exists a glass ceiling
to women’s ascension by checking whether gender matters in how much time it takes to get a promotion
to a managerial position. This is in stark contrast with most papers that tackle gender diﬀerences in
promotions in that they mainly focus on computing the promotion probability rather than duration.
Investigating diﬀerences in promotions is particularly diﬃcult because observationally similar male and
female workers may display equal promotion rates and durations even in the presence of gender diﬀerences
(e.g., promotions may diﬀer in quality).
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study to examine gender diﬀerences in promotions using micro-data
from a developing country. Apart from the obvious interest in verifying whether the main stylized facts
hold in a Latin American country, the motivation also lies on the quality, reliability and availability of
the Brazilian data. In contrast to the many studies that employ data from individual ﬁrms (see, e.g.,
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994), we rely on a homogeneous sample of recently hired workers from the
Brazilian transformation industry in the period running from 1996 to 2004. This allows us to portray the
big picture in that we may address not only intra-ﬁrm promotions, but also inter-ﬁrm promotions (see
discussion in Booth and Francesconi, 2000).
Our data set is particularly convenient for the empirical analysis of gender diﬀerences in promotions.
First, it conveys information not only on promotions, but also on wage growths, allowing us to control for
promotion quality. Second, the data include a wide array of controls for worker and ﬁrm characteristics.
Third, as opposed to Blau and deVaro (2006), we observe multiple workers per establishment at diﬀerent
occupations and hierarchical levels as well as their career paths in terms of occupation, promotions, and
wage increases even if they move from one ﬁrm to another within the Brazilian transformation industry.
A potential limitation is that our data set does not include any direct measure of on-the-job productivity
and hence we must come up with indirect controls.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that, although there are signiﬁcative gender diﬀerences in promotions within
domestic ﬁrms, the same does not apply for foreign-owned ﬁrms in the Brazilian transformation industry.
Our ﬁndings complements to some extent the literature on the diﬀerences between multinationals and
purely domestic ﬁrms (Doms and Jensen, 2006; Greene, Hornstein, White and Yeung, 2006) as well as
deVaro and Samuelson’s (2005) evidence that gender diﬀerences may depend on the nature of the ﬁrm (e.g.,
nonproﬁt versus for-proﬁt). We conjecture that such diﬀerences are due to the fact that multinationals face
diﬀerent interest group pressures (e.g., labor unions and environmental groups) than domestic ﬁrms. This
is especially true in Latin America, where multinationals have historically been among the usual suspects,
and hence perfect candidates for scapegoats. Finally, it turns out that our main empirical ﬁnding is
extremely robust to variations in the sample, model speciﬁcation, and estimation methods as well as to the
deﬁnition of promotion. As for the latter, we evince similar results for wage growth and interﬁrm (rather
than intra-ﬁrm) promotions.
This paper mainly relates to the literature on gender diﬀerences in career mobility. On the one hand, the
theoretical literature on career mobility mainly focus on schooling (Sicherman and Galor, 1990), abstracting
away from gender diﬀerences. There are a few exceptions, though. Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003)
derive a model that distinguishes between the initial pay increase upon promotion and subsequent pay
increases. Under the assumption that women have worse market alternatives, the model implications are
consistent with their empirical ﬁndings that gender does not aﬀect promotion rates, though women receive
lower wage gains. Baldwin, Butler and Johnson (2001) identify the eﬀects of occupational segregation on
3gender wage gaps using a hierarchical discrimination model in which men dislike supervision by female
managers. They predict an exponential decline in the relative proportion of female workers in the top tiers
of the job ladder, which is in line with the evidence from a 1988 CPS sample of workers in the insurance
industry.
On the other hand, it is common practice in the empirical literature to also include gender among the
determinants of job mobility and promotion likelihoods (see, e.g., Groot and van den Brink, 1996; Booth
and Francesconi, 2000; Blau and deVaro, 2006) in view that men and women may diﬀer in alternative
opportunities (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Royalty, 1998) as well as in job search
costs (Meitzen, 1986). For instance, women may face more constraints either to work longer hours or even
to remain in the labor market. If women are more likely to quit, ﬁrms will have less incentives to train and
promote them. On the other hand, if women view promotion as unlikely due to discriminatory promotion
practices, they may refrain to put themselves forward for training programmes at the ﬁrm (Arrow, 1972).
Our mixed evidence of gender diﬀerences in promotions complements well the collection of empirical
ﬁndings concerning the glass-ceiling eﬀect. Cannings and Montmarquette (1991) evince signiﬁcant gender
diﬀerences in the promotion rate among mid-level managers in a Canadian services ﬁrms. Ransom and
Oaxaca (2005) employ a panel data set from a large grocery retailer in US to estimate a Markov chain
model of job mobility for the periods running from 1976 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1986,1 as well as the
probability of food clerk in 1978 to become store-level manager by 1982. Their results are consistent with
Cannings and Montmarquette (1991) in that a male food clerk is about six times more likely to become
a store-level manager than a female food clerk. In addition, they also conclude that the lawsuit had a
dramatic impact on occupational assignments and mobility. See also Cabral, Ferber and Green (1981),
Spurr (1990), Barnett, Baron and Stuart (2000), Acosta (2006), and Blau and deVaro (2006) for additional
evidence supporting gender diﬀerences as well as Lewis (1986), Powell and Butterﬁeld (1994), Paulin and
Mellor (1996), Petersen and Saporta (2004), and Giuliano, Levine and Leonard (2005) for evidence against
gender diﬀerences.
As for gender diﬀerences in the time it takes to get a promotion, McCue (1996) examines data from
1976 to 1988 of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The ﬁndings are quite interesting in that
the time to promotion for single women is comparable to men’s, whereas married women usually take more
time to get a promotion. In contrast, time to promotion for male employees does not depend on their
civil state. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2006) analyze gender diﬀerences in the metallurgical industry in
Finland. They evince that women usually take more time to get a promotion than men with similar jobs,
even though women are consistently more productive than men once one controls for promotion outcomes.
They thus conclude that women must exceed a much higher level of productivity to obtain a promotion
than men.
The remainder of this paper ensues as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of our database,
whereas Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology that we employ to assess whether there is gender
diﬀerences in promotions. Section 4 then reports the ﬁndings of our empirical analysis, while Section 5
collects the results of a series of robustness checks. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Data description
The IPEA data set we employ gathers information from several databases. In particular, it combines data
from the Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS), covering the period running from 1996 to 2005, as
well as data from the 1996 Annual Industrial Survey (PIA) in 1996 and from the 1995 Census of Foreign
Capital (CEB).
RAIS is an administrative register of the Ministry of Labor (MTE) that provides socioeconomic in-
formation regarding the employees of every ﬁrm in the Brazilian formal sector. It reports the employees’
identifying security number, age, gender, schooling level, job tenure, monthly stipend, occupation, num-
ber of hours at work, type of labor contract, nationality, and month of admission. In addition, it also
1 They separate the two periods so as to verify whether the class-action lawsuit over gender discrimination that the ﬁrm
faced in the early 1980s had any eﬀect on the relative status of female employees.
4documents the ﬁrm’s identifying ﬁscal number, sector of activity, and location. PIA is a survey from the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) that focus only on ﬁrms with 30 or more employees.
It not only covers a very large sample of small and medium ﬁrms, but also the complete universe of ﬁrms
with 500 or more employees. We make use of the 1996 PIA data set to check the RAIS data for misreports
as well as to obtain a more precise classiﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s sector of activity.
The Central Bank of Brazil publishes the CEB every ﬁve years, collecting information on the origin of
the shareholders’ capital for every ﬁrm in Brazil. We employ the CEB to classify ﬁrms into multinational
or not. We deﬁne as multinational a ﬁrm in which more than 50% of the shareholders’ capital is foreign,
though we also control later for the proportion of foreign capital. Matching data from RAIS and CEB
reveals that women amount to 21% of the employees in multinationals of the Brazilian transformation
industry, occupying 13% of their managerial positions. The ﬁgures are similar for ﬁrms with less than 50%
of foreign capital, namely, 25% and 15%, respectively.
To form a homogeneous RAIS sample, we focus on individuals meeting the following criteria on January
1996. First, the individual must work in a proﬁt-seeking private ﬁrm with 500 or more employees in the
Brazilian transformation industry. Second, the individual must work full time (i.e., at least 40 hours per
week) and hold a university degree. Third, the individual must have joined the ﬁrm between January
1989 and November 1995, with an age between 20 and 26. Fourth, the individual must receive a monthly
stipend above 5 minimum wages either as an accountant, administrator, director, economist, engineer,
intermediate manager, lawyer, manager, or purchases/sales supervisor. Fifth, the individual must also
have a labor contract with no expiration date.
The resulting sample includes 636 ﬁrms, of which 145 are multinationals, that altogether employ 3,854
male and 1,213 female workers. As for occupations, engineers are the mode with 48.4% of the observations.
This is not surprising given that all ﬁrms belong to the transformation industry. The average individual
in our sample is 27 years old, works about 43 hours per week, and has been working for three years in the
ﬁrm. There is a fraction of 12.5% of women occupying managerial positions, whereas the analogous ﬁgure
drops to 11.7% for men. Table 1 stratiﬁes the sample according to occupation and gender, whereas Table
2 reports the sample averages of the individuals’ main characteristics.
3 Duration model for time to promotion
In this section, we describe the duration model that we estimate to address gender diﬀerences in promotions.
We ﬁrst deﬁne time to promotion as the time it takes to the individual to get a promotion to a managerial
position either in the same or in another ﬁrm. Although we also consider a semiparametric duration model
later, we start with a simple linear regression speciﬁcation for the log of the time to promotion:
lnT∗ = Xi β + i, (1)
where T∗
i gauges how much time it takes to the individual i to obtain a promotion, Xi is a vector of control
variates, and i is an error term with scale and shape parameters σ and ς, respectively. In the context of
duration models, (1) corresponds to an accelerated failure time speciﬁcation.
We construct the duration variable by following every individual that appears in the 1996 RAIS up
to 2004. As some individuals do not obtain a promotion to managerial positions before 2004, we do
not observe the time they take to get a promotion. The same occurs to individuals who already are in
managerial positions (i.e., either managers or directors) in the beginning of our sample. All we know is for
how long he has been working in the ﬁrm, which could at best bound from above the time to promotion
if they have not changed jobs. Altogether, this means that promotion durations may exhibit both left
and right censoring, though the former is not very likely given the criteria we have used to construct the
sample.
Under censoring, instead of observing the time to promotion T∗
i for each individual in our sample, we






i in the absence of censorship
Li under left censoring
Ri under right censoring
(2)
5where Li and Ri correspond to how much time the individual i has on the job on January 1996 and on
December 2004, respectively. If the individual i exits the ﬁrm before December 2004, then the right-
censoring variable Ri denotes tenure on the job, without receiving a promotion, up to the exit date.
The control variables are either from the RAIS database of January 1996 or from the 1995 CEB. In
particular, we construct the binary variables male and January1993 to control for the individual’s gender
and tenure in the ﬁrm. The latter equals one for individuals who joined the ﬁrm after January 1993, zero
otherwise. We also include the dummy variables multinational and Southeast that respectively take
value one for ﬁrms with more than 50% of foreign capital and for ﬁrms located in the (relative much
richer) Southeast of Brazil. Finally, we also consider the interaction dummy male×multinational and
the continuous variable size corresponding to the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the
ﬁrm that the individual works for.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of the error term in (1), with density function f and
















where ri and `i are indicator functions relating to whether observations are under censoring either to the
right or to the left.
Although we relax such an assumption in Section 5, for the sake of exposition, we initially suppose
that both ri and `i are independent of the regressors. This assumption is indeed strong in that it rules out
the situation in which women are more likely to quit their jobs than men, as in Lazear and Rosen’s (1990)
model.2 Table 3 documents that 10.8% of the durations relating to male workers exhibit no censoring,
whereas 77.8% display right censoring and 11.4% left censoring. These ﬁgures are respectively 4.5%, 83%,
and 12.4% for female women.
The next section discusses the estimation results. We maximize the log-likelihood using the Newton-
Raphson algorithm in SAS 8.2 and compute standard errors using the inverse of the estimated information
matrix.
4 Promotions in the Brazilian transformation industry
The duration model we estimate assumes a generalized gamma distribution for promotion durations.
There are two distributional parameters, namely, the scale and shape parameters σ and ς. We employ
the generalized gamma distribution because it encompasses most of the distributions that appear in the
duration literature. In particular, the generalized gamma coincides with the lognormal distribution if ς = 0
and with the Weibull distribution if ς = 1/σ. We thus examine using log-likelihood ratio tests whether the
distributional parameter estimates are consistent with the lognormal and Weibull distributions. Table 4
reports the estimation results according to the distribution assumption.
The estimates of the regression coeﬃcients are very similar regardless of the distribution assumption.
They indicate that, within ﬁrms of domestic capital, there are signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in promotions.
In particular, male employees wait signiﬁcantly less than female employees to get a promotion. The time
to promotion for men is, on average, from 31% to 35% shorter than that for women depending on the
distribution. In contrast, there is no evidence supporting gender diﬀerence within multinationals. Table
5 indeed documents that the sum of the regression coeﬃcients relating to the dummy variables male
and male×multinational does not statistically diﬀer from zero. In addition, time to promotion is
relatively shorter in ﬁrms of foreign rather than domestic capital, indicating that, on average, women in
multinationals obtain their promotions faster than men in ﬁrms with domestic capital.
Our results also evince a negative size eﬀect. If one increases by 1% the number of employees in the ﬁrm,
the employees will have to wait, on average, 6.7% more to obtain a promotion. This is not surprising due to
2 The empirical evidence is conﬂicting at best. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen’s (2006) results conﬁrm that women quit more
often than men, whereas Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) and Blau and Kahn (1981) ﬁnd no evidence supporting such gender
diﬀerences.
6the competition eﬀect. The number of managerial positions indeed increases much less than proportionally
with the number of employees. Finally, there is some mixing evidence as for the location of the ﬁrm. Under
the generalized gamma assumption, the estimated regression coeﬃcient suggests that promotion takes a
signiﬁcantly longer spell in the Southeast of Brazil as opposed to the insigniﬁcant estimates based on the
lognormal and Weibull distributions. The log-likelihood ratio test results in Table 6 however reject the
latter distributions, suggesting that the generalized gamma estimates are more reliable.
4.1 Wage growth and promotion likelihood
Booth et al.’s (2003) model predicts that gender does not aﬀect promotion likelihood, though female em-
ployees receive lower wage gains. We thus turn to investigating gender diﬀerences in promotion likelihoods
and in wage growths. In particular, we compute the percentage variation in the number of minimum wages
from January 1996 to December 2004, viz.
wage in December 2004 − wage in January 1996
wage in January 1996
,
for a sample that includes only individuals who worked for the same ﬁrm in the period ranging from
January 1996 to December 2004. We then perform a linear regression so as to control for the gender, age,
and job tenure of the individual as well as for the size, origin of capital, and location of the ﬁrm.
Table 7 conﬁrms by a long chalk our previous results. In particular, wage increases seem signiﬁcantly
higher in multinationals than in domestic ﬁrms. In addition we ﬁnd no evidence supporting gender dif-
ferences in wage variations within multinational ﬁrms, whereas domestic ﬁrms seem to favor their male
employees. To control for heterogeneity, we also compute heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
They are very similar to the standard errors that we compute under homoskedasticity. This means not
only that there is no evidence of residual heteroskedasticity, but also that there are no qualitative changes
in the results.3
To verify whether the probability of promotion depends on gender, we run a logit regression in which
the dependent variable takes value one if the individual obtains a promotion to a managerial position in
the period ranging from January 1996 to December 2004 within the ﬁrm, or else it equals zero. We control
once more for the gender, age, and job tenure of the individual as well as for the size, origin of capital, and
location of the ﬁrm. The results in Table 8 evince that domestic ﬁrms seems to display gender diﬀerences in
promotions not only in terms of how much time it takes to get a promotion, but also in terms of promotion
likelihood. Female employees are less likely to get promoted in domestic ﬁrms, whereas the same does not
happen to male employees who have the same odds as workers in multinationals.
Altogether, these results contradict to some extent the evidence and theory put forth by Booth et al.
(2003) in that multinationals feature no gender diﬀerences in promotions, either in terms of duration or
of likelihood, as well as in wage variation. In contrast, there are severe gender diﬀerences in promotions
within domestic ﬁrms, especially in terms of the probability of getting a promotion.
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we run a battery of robustness checks to verify whether our ﬁndings indeed hold water.
First, we consider diﬀerent samples so as to cope with potential bias due either to omitted variables or
to sample selection. In particular, we aim to check whether individuals’ former occupation aﬀects their
time to promotion. Second, we extend our deﬁnition of promotion so as to include individuals who obtain
their promotion by moving from one ﬁrm to another. Third, we examine whether there is any qualitative
change in the results if we consider a sample that conﬁnes attention to individuals in their ﬁrst job and in
certain occupations.
3 We also perform some speciﬁcation tests, e.g., Ramsey’s RESET, to check whether the linear regression model for wage
variation is congruent. All testing results are positive in that they cannot reject our linear speciﬁcation.
75.1 Former occupation
The duration models in Section 4 do not account for the occupation of the individuals prior to their promo-
tion to a managerial position in view that it is unobservable under left censoring. This may contaminate
our results for two reasons. First, Table 1 documents that there exists substantial occupational segmenta-
tion, and hence it may result in spurious gender diﬀerences. Second, the career path in the transformation
industry presumably depends on the occupation the individual has. It seems reasonable to expect lawyers
to wait more, on average, for a promotion than engineers in the transformation industry. We then esti-
mate a duration model that includes former occupation dummies as controls for a sample that excludes all
left-censored observations. These dummy variables assume value one if the individual’s occupation before
promotion was either engineer, intermediate manager, or (purchase and sales) supervisor.
Table 9 reports the resulting estimates, which single out a quite diﬀerent story. First, there is no
signiﬁcant ﬁrm size eﬀect. Second, gender diﬀerences within domestic ﬁrms are much lower than before in
that time to promotion for men is, on average, only 23% shorter than for women within ﬁrms of domestic
capital. Third, gender diﬀerences within multinationals are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. As for occupational
diﬀerences, engineers take on average 29% less time to get a promotion than accountants, administrators,
economists, and lawyers. The diﬀerences are even higher for supervisors and, especially, for intermediate
managers. Table 10 also shows that the parameter estimates do not change much if one assumes either a
lognormal or a Weibull distribution.
Although it avoids the omitted variable bias, this sample entails a substantial selection bias. In particu-
lar, by excluding the individuals with presumably shorter time to promotion (i.e., managers and directors),
it may distort the evidence relating to gender diﬀerences in promotions. The estimation results in Table
4 indicate that women are, on average, promoted in less time than male employees within multinationals,
whereas the converse is true within domestic ﬁrms. We thus expect the sample selection bias to downplay
the female advantage within multinationals as well as the gender diﬀerences within domestic ﬁrms.
To have a more precise idea of the magnitude of the sample selection bias, we estimate the original
duration model, i.e., without former occupation dummies as controls, for the sample without left-censored
observations. Table 9 documents that, as expected, gender diﬀerence in domestic ﬁrms, as measured by the
magnitude of the estimated regression coeﬃcient of the gender dummy male, decreases from 0.442 to 0.317
if one excludes the left-censored observations and to 0.260 if one additionally includes the former occupation
dummies as controls. As for the female advantage within multinationals, the magnitude of the estimated
regression coeﬃcient of the ﬁrm dummy multinational decreases from 0.448 to 0.175 if one excludes
the left-censored observations and to 0.136 if one additionally includes the former occupation dummies
as controls. Finally, male advantage within multinationals, as measured by the sum of the estimated
coeﬃcients of the dummy variables male, multinational, and male×multinational, remains stable
across the speciﬁcations in Tables 4 and 9 (with a magnitude between 0.35 and 0.40).
Altogether, controlling for former occupation does not suﬃce to disrupt our main result in that we still
ﬁnd no strong evidence of gender diﬀerences in promotions within multinationals once we account for the
sample selection bias. As before, the same does not apply for domestic ﬁrms, where women have to wait
signiﬁcantly more time to be promoted than male employees.
5.2 Broader deﬁnition of promotion
We consider so far only promotion within a ﬁrm, without accounting for the possibility that individuals
may move up to a managerial position through interﬁrm (rather than intra-ﬁrm) promotions. This seems
particularly relevant in that the turnover in the Brazilian labor market is extremely high. It turns out that
74% of men and 69% of women get their promotion by moving from one ﬁrm to another. We thus create
another sample in which promotion may occur in a diﬀerent ﬁrm than the one that employs the individual
in January 1996. Table 11 reports the main descriptive statistics.
The results in Table 12 reveal that, if starting at a multinational ﬁrm, it takes more time for female
employees to be promoted than male employees who, in turn, take slightly less time to be promoted than
individuals (regardless of the gender) starting at a domestic ﬁrm. One possible explanation rests on the
sociology literature that emphasizes the better networking skills that men presumably exhibit (Fernandez
8and Weinberg, 1997; Fernandez, Castilla and Moore, 2000; Fernandez and Sosa, 2005), which contribute
to their advantage in terms of interﬁrm promotions. Moreover, given that domestic ﬁrms pay on average
less than multinationals, networking skills would aﬀect more male employees in domestic ﬁrms than in
multinationals just as we observe.
5.3 Shorter job tenure
The sample so far includes individuals that have joined the ﬁrm between January 1989 and November
1995, with an age between 20 and 26. This pretty much ensures that most individuals in our sample are
in their ﬁrst job. We may however miss individuals who has joined the ﬁrm after January 1989, but left
before January 1996. This could well entail some sort of sample selection bias, and hence we change the
sampling procedure to consider only individuals with tenure between 3 and 6 months. This ensures not
only that we are dealing with individuals in their ﬁrst jobs, but also that we are not missing any individual
who has already left the ﬁrm before January 1996. In this section, we mainly adopt the broader notion of
promotion (i.e., both intra- and interﬁrm promotions) in order to avoid dealing with a very small sample
size. Table 13 reports the main descriptive statistics for this alternative sample.
Table 14 displays the estimation results for the sample corresponding to the broader deﬁnition of
promotion and to individuals in their ﬁrst jobs. Although the main results remain valid in that there are
gender diﬀerences only within domestic ﬁrms, ranking time to promotion by gender and origin of capital
portray a slightly diﬀerent picture. It seems that male employees in their ﬁrst jobs take much less time to
get promoted than female employees within a domestic ﬁrm. The latter take the same time, on average,
as workers of both sexes within multinationals.
We next restrict attention to engineers and intermediate managers in their ﬁrst job so as to improve
on homogeneity. Table 15 reports the results for both the original and broader notions of promotion.
Although the diﬀerences are palpable, both results evince gender diﬀerences only within domestic ﬁrms.
In particular, female engineers and intermediate managers take more time to get a intra-ﬁrm promotion
within domestic ﬁrms, whereas accounting for interﬁrm promotions is especially relevant for male engineers
and intermediate managers within domestic ﬁrms.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether there exists a glass ceiling to women’s ascension in the largest ﬁrms of
the Brazilian transformation industry. Our main goal is to check whether gender matters in the time it
takes to get a promotion to a managerial position, even though we also assess gender diﬀerences in wage
growths. The motivation lies not only on the natural interest in assessing gender diﬀerences in a developing
country, but also on the particular features of the Brazilian data set. As it also conveys information on
wage growths, we may to some extent control for promotion quality apart from the usual set of controls
for worker and ﬁrm characteristics. Moreover, we observe multiple workers per establishment at diﬀerent
occupations and hierarchical levels as well as their career paths in terms of occupation, promotions, and
wage increases even if they move from one ﬁrm to another within the Brazilian transformation industry.
This allows us to draw a larger picture by addressing both intra-ﬁrm and interﬁrm promotions.
We ﬁnd that, although there are signiﬁcative gender diﬀerences in promotions within domestic ﬁrms,
the same does not seem to apply for foreign-owned ﬁrms. The results are very robust in that there are no
qualitative changes if one employs diﬀerent samples and model speciﬁcations. Finally, although our main
focus in on gender diﬀerences in times to promotion, we evince similar gender diﬀerences within domestic
ﬁrms in terms of promotion likelihoods and of wage gains. Our results thus complement well the recent
evidence that the nature of the ﬁrm may entail substantial diﬀerences in managerial practices and in the
role of promotions (Doms and Jensen, 2006; deVaro and Samuelson, 2005; Greene et al., 2006). The main
limitation of our empirical analysis is that our data set lacks a direct measure of on-the-job productivity.
Although we attempt to control for that by considering diﬀerent samples, it would be enlightening to
employ better measures, even if indirect, of productivity or job performance.
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11Table 1
Sample size according to gender and occupation
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The label ‘absolute’ refers
to the number of observations in that cell, whereas ‘relative’ corresponds to the relative sample size as a
percentage of the total number of observations in that column. We group under ‘aael’ all individuals that
work as accountants, administrators, economists, and lawyers.
female male total occupation
absolute relative absolute relative absolute relative
engineers 333 27.5% 2,120 55.0% 2,453 48.4%
aael group 385 31.7% 384 10.0% 769 15.2%
intermediate managers 175 14.4% 527 13.7% 702 13.9%
supervisors 169 13.9% 382 9.9% 551 10.9%
managers 149 12.3% 435 11.3% 584 11.5%
directors 2 0.2% 6 0.2% 8 0.2%
total 1,213 100% 3,854 100% 5,067 100%
Table 2
Sample statistics according to gender
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The columns
‘mean’ refer to sample averages, whereas the columns ‘st.dev.’ correspond to the sample
standard deviations. We gauge ‘age’ and ‘tenure’ (time in the job) in years, whereas ‘monthly
stipend’ is in number of minimum wages.
female male total variable
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
age 27.10 2.15 27.46 2.28 27.38 2.26
tenure 2.97 1.98 3.12 2.08 3.08 2.06
hours at work per week 42.99 1.55 43.01 1.62 43.01 1.61
monthly stipend 18.81 9.62 23.13 11.12 22.09 10.93


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of the promotion duration. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘st.error’ report maximum likelihood
estimates of the regression coeﬃcients and their standard errors, respectively. ‘female ratio’ denotes the pro-
portion of female employees in the ﬁrm at which the individual works. In the bottom panel, we report the overall
number of observations as well as the number of uncensored, left censored, and right censored observations.
generalized gamma lognormal Weibull
coeﬃcient st.error coeﬃcient st.error coeﬃcient st.error
constant 7.5929 0.4865 7.3612 0.5192 7.5980 0.4790
January1993 0.8551 0.1088 0.8020 0.1210 0.8669 0.1114
male -1.6331 0.2460 -1.4846 0.2610 -1.6569 0.2558
male×multinational 0.8187 0.2625 1.0270 0.2905 0.9177 0.2730
multinational -1.0292 0.2441 -1.1045 0.2633 -1.0830 0.2519
male×female ratio 2.3908 0.7051 2.6774 0.9382 2.6098 0.7961
female ratio -2.9293 0.6167 -3.9500 0.8171 -3.3790 0.6979
Southeast 0.1415 0.1119 0.1097 0.1335 0.1367 0.1193
size 0.0783 0.0549 0.0328 0.0638 0.0617 0.0574
exports 0.0204 0.0098 0.0395 0.0120 0.0254 0.0106
scale parameter σ 0.8436 0.5306 2.9963 0.1043 1.7886 0.0666
shape parameter ς 2.3744 1.4969 0 0.5591 0.0208
sample size 5,067 5,067 5,067
uncensored 678 678 678
left-censored 592 592 592
right-censored 3,797 3,797 3,797
14Table 5
Likelihood ratio tests for gender diﬀerence in multinationals
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The
restricted log-likelihood value refers to constraining the maximum likelihood estimator
such that the sum of the regression coeﬃcients relating to the dummy variables male
and male×multinational equals zero. The asymptotic distribution of the likelihood
ratio statistic is a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom and hence the





generalized gamma -3,893.26 -3,898.99 11.46
lognormal -3,931.94 -3,933.18 2.48
Weibull -3,901.04 -3,905.22 8.36
Table 6
Likelihood ratio tests for the error distribution
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases.
The unrestricted log-likelihood value refers to the maximum likelihood estimation
under the generalized gamma distribution, whereas the restricted log-likelihood
value corresponds to constraining the shape parameter ς either to zero or to one,
so that the generalized gamma distribution reduces to the lognormal or Weibull
distributions, respectively. The asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio
statistic is a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom and hence the





lognormal (ς = 0) -3,893.26 -3,931.94 77.36
Weibull (ς = 1) -3,893.26 -3,901.04 15.56
15Table 7
Linear regression analysis for wage growth
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases, including only
individuals who have been working on the same ﬁrm between January 1996 and December 2004.
The dependent variable is the percentage variation in wage from January 1996 to December 2004:
wage in December 2004 − wage in January 1996
wage in January 1996
.
The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ ‘standard error’ and ‘robust standard error’ report least-squares estimates
of the regression coeﬃcients and their standard errors under homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity,
respectively. The bottom panel reports the number of cross-sectional observations.
coeﬃcient standard error robust standard error
constant 1.4182 0.3249 0.3247
age -0.0292 0.0126 0.0132
size -0.0383 0.0138 0.0128
tenure -0.0191 0.0140 0.0144
male 0.1122 0.0522 0.0506
multinational 0.1939 0.0743 0.0701
male×multinational -0.1111 0.0812 0.0784
Southeast -0.0706 0.0378 0.0410
sample size 980
16Table 8
Logit regression for the probability of promotion
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS
databases. The dependent variable takes value one if the individual obtains
a promotion to a managerial position in the period ranging from January
1996 to December 2005, or else it equals zero. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and
‘standard error’ report logistic estimates of the regression coeﬃcients and
their standard errors, respectively. The bottom panel reports the overall
number of observations as well as the number of observations relating to








male×female ratio 1.8270 1.2262








Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model with no left censoring
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the promotion duration. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘standard error’ report
maximum likelihood estimates and their standard errors under the log-generalized gamma distribution. In
model i, we estimate the original duration model for a sample that excludes all left-censored observations,
whereas model ii controls for former occupation using dummy variables that assume value one if the
individual’s occupation before promotion was either engineer, intermediate manager, or (purchase and
sales) supervisor. The row ‘LR statistic, sum zero’ refers to the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coeﬃcients relating to male and male×multinational equals zero. The asymptotic critical values are
6.63, 3.84, and 2.71 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. In the bottom panel, we
report the overall number of observations as well as the number of uncensored, left censored, and right
censored observations.
model i model ii
coeﬃcient standard error coeﬃcient standard error
constant 6.7865 0.2751 6.9416 0.2968
January1993 -0.0182 0.0660 -0.0812 0.0704
engineer -0.1765 0.0921
supervisor -0.2324 0.1162
intermediate manager -0.5441 0.1080
male -1.0040 0.1499 -0.9361 0.1521
male×multinational 0.1787 0.1640 0.1336 0.1643
multinational -0.3753 0.1542 -0.3038 0.1547
male×female ratio 1.6047 0.5372 1.4923 0.5461
female ratio -1.0977 0.4726 -0.8590 0.4797
Southeast 0.2180 0.0695 0.1728 0.0701
size 0.0320 0.0326 0.0417 0.0331
exports 0.0004 0.0064 -0.0044 0.0065
scale parameter σ 1.3799 0.1570 1.4651 0.1563
shape parameter ς -0.2200 0.2714 -0.4058 0.3021
LR statistic, sum zero 5.03





Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model with
no left censoring under alternative distributions
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases. The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the promotion duration. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘standard error’ report
maximum likelihood estimates and their standard errors under the log-generalized gamma distribution. The
former occupational dummy variables assume value one if the individual’s occupation before promotion
was either engineer, intermediate manager, or (purchase and sales) supervisor. The row ‘LR statistic,
distribution’ reports the statistic for the null hypothesis that the error distribution is either lognormal or
Weibull rather than a generalized gamma distribution. The row ‘LR statistic, sum zero’ refers to the null
hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients relating to male and male×multinational equals zero. The
asymptotic critical values for both LR tests are 6.63, 3.84, and 2.71 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of
signiﬁcance, respectively. In the bottom panel, we report the overall number of observations as well as the
number of uncensored, left censored, and right censored observations.
lognormal Weibull
coeﬃcient standard error coeﬃcient standard error
constant 7.0336 0.2809 7.0090 0.2741
January1993 -0.0344 0.0588 0.0395 0.0542
engineer -0.1850 0.0923 -0.2130 0.0920
supervisor -0.2224 0.1158 -0.1889 0.1139
intermediate manager -0.5231 0.1062 -0.4674 0.1025
male -0.9662 0.1538 -0.9736 0.1647
male×multinational 0.1660 0.1644 0.2204 0.1686
multinational -0.3449 0.1544 -0.4075 0.1615
male×female ratio 1.5231 0.5409 1.4855 0.5264
female ratio -0.8932 0.4795 -0.9073 0.4773
Southeast 0.1550 0.0669 0.0985 0.0602
size 0.0379 0.0320 0.0355 0.0290
exports -0.0039 0.0064 -0.0033 0.0061
scale parameter σ 1.2456 0.0410 0.6608 0.0245
shape parameter ς 1.5134 0.0561
LR statistic, distribution 24.76 0.12
LR statistic, sum zero 6.38 4.92

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model
for the broader deﬁnition of promotion
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS
databases. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the promotion
duration. We extend the deﬁnition of promotion so as to include individuals
that get a promotion either in the ﬁrm they work for in January 1996 or in
another ﬁrm. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘standard error’ report maximum
likelihood estimates of the regression coeﬃcients under the generalized gamma
distribution and their standard errors, respectively. In the bottom panel, we
report the overall number of observations as well as the number of uncensored,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model for the broader
deﬁnition of promotion and only individuals with shorter tenure
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS
databases, including only individuals that have joined the ﬁrm between July
and September 1995. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
promotion duration. We extend the deﬁnition of promotion so as to include
individuals that get a promotion either in the ﬁrm they work for in January
1996 or in another ﬁrm. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘standard error’ report
maximum likelihood estimates of the regression coeﬃcients under the general-
ized gamma distribution and their standard errors, respectively. In the bottom
panel, we report the overall number of observations as well as the number of









scale parameter σ 1.0384 0.1483






Maximum likelihood estimates of the duration model for the sample
including only engineers and intermediate managers with shorter tenure
Our sample results from matching data from the 1996 PIA and RAIS databases, including only
engineers and intermediate managers that have joined the ﬁrm between July and September 1995.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the promotion duration. We consider two
deﬁnitions of promotion. The ﬁrst restricts attention to promotion within the ﬁrm the individual
works for in January 1996, whereas the second deﬁnition is broader in that it considers both intra-
and interﬁrm promotion. The columns ‘coeﬃcient’ and ‘standard error’ report maximum likelihood
estimates of the regression coeﬃcients under the lognormal distribution and their standard errors,
respectively. In the bottom panel, we report the overall number of observations as well as the
number of uncensored, left censored, and right censored observations.
intra-ﬁrm any ﬁrm
coeﬃcient standard error coeﬃcient standard error
constant 8.0489 1.1992 7.4376 1.5419
male -0.2410 0.2067 -0.5374 0.3925
male×multinational 0.6516 0.3248 1.0178 0.6018
multinational -0.2653 0.2341 -0.0811 0.5048
Southeast -0.5295 0.1890 0.0722 0.3370
size -0.5944 0.1374 -0.3390 0.1714
scale parameter σ 0.6459 0.2347 1.5215 0.1464
shape parameter ς -17.4338 5.6566 -1.3710 0.8727
sample size 196 196
uncensored 27 65
left-censored 0 0
right-censored 169 131
24